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Democracy without Democracy?: Can the EU’s Democratic ‘Outputs’ be 





Various EU analysts suggest that although a democratic deficit exists from the 
perspective of ‘input’ democracy, democratic processes such as competitive parties 
and majority rule are neither necessary nor suitable to secure democratic ‘outputs’ of 
the kind the EU delivers. This article disputes this claim. ‘Input’ arguments are vital 
to the legitimacy of decision making in the EU’s policy areas and the non- and 
counter-majoritarian mechanisms these analysts advocate have perverse rather than 
beneficial effects on  the quality of   ‘outputs’. 
 
Democratic deficit, majority rule, ‘input’ and ‘output’ democracy 
 
Notwithstanding Schattschneider’s famous remark that ‘modern democracy is 
unthinkable save in terms of political parties’ (Schattschneider 1942, p. 1), political 
theorists and political scientists have come increasingly to think the unthinkable. 
Normative theorists have long been tempted to distinguish the ideal of democracy 
from the modern reality, favouring the various ideas Joseph Schumpeter lumped 
together as the ‘classic theory’ of democracy over his ‘other model’ of ‘that 
institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions by means of a competitive 
struggle for the people’s vote’ (Schumpeter 1976, p. 269). While these scholars view 
this alternative as an accurate account of actual democratic practice, they regard it as 
normatively limited (e.g. Duncan and Lukes 1963).  Meanwhile, declining party 
membership and voter turnout has begun to challenge the descriptive value of this 
model, prompting a number of political scientists also to return to the ‘classic theory’ 
as a source of democratic ideals that might be better realised by somewhat different 
democratic practices to those found in most working democracies (e.g. Dalton 2004).  
The EU has offered particularly fertile ground for such thinking (Cohen and 
Sabel 1997; Majone 1998, 2001; Moravscik 2002; Sabel and Zeitlin 2007). With the 
traditional forms of competitive party democracy and majority rule proving harder to 
 2 
establish and more attenuated at the EU level than in any of the member states, it has 
become a veritable laboratory of new modes of democratic governance. The basic 
normative claim of these schemes has been to see democracy in terms of ‘outputs’ 
rather than ‘inputs’. ‘Input’ considerations relate to the democratic character of the 
decision procedure, and in particular the right of all citizens to participate on an equal 
basis in political decision-making. By contrast, ‘output’ considerations relate to the 
degree to which the substance of the decision can be said to promote collective 
interests in a manner compatible with the democratic goals of equal concern and 
respect (Scharpf 1999a, pp. 2, 6-13). Their proponents argue that the ‘actual existing’ 
model of majoritarian, party democracy may have reasonable, if weakening, 
credentials on ‘input’ grounds, but what counts are democratic ‘outputs’. These might 
be achieved better by more idealised forms of democratic decision-making that 
possess limited conventional democratic ‘input’. Indeed, such limitations may be 
necessary to obtain democratic ‘outputs’ due to distortions in the standard ‘input’ 
process.  
 What follows explores the merits of ‘input’ and ‘output’ democracy in relation 
to the EU. I start by outlining the basic arguments for democratic ‘input’, noting how 
they are broadly met by a system comprising majority rule and competing parties. I 
then examine two versions of the ‘output’ argument found in both the literature, and 
the EU’s structures and policies. Neither can justify curtailing democratic inputs. The 
conclusion briefly proposes how ‘input’ and ‘output’ considerations might be met 
within the EU given the persistent difficulties experienced in establishing the former. 
 
‘Input’ Democracy 
Some commentators suggest ‘input’ arguments carry no independent weight apart 
from their contribution to a certain kind of ‘output’. Thus, Fritz Scharpf in his 
influential use of this distinction within EU studies argues that ‘modern input-
orientated theorists rarely derive legitimacy primarily from the belief “that the people 
can do no wrong”. Instead, they insist that policy inputs should arise from public 
debates that have the qualities of truth-orientated deliberations and discourses’ 
(Scharpf 1999b, p. 269). He suggests ‘input’ assumes not just ‘participation’ but also 
convergence on a ‘consensus’ that reflects the general will – itself only likely among a 
demos sharing a strong cultural identity, so that ‘the justification of majority rule must 
be considered as the crucial problem of input-orientated theories of democratic 
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legitimization.’ (1999a p. 7) However, this argument misrepresents much mainstream 
work in democratic theory (e.g. Dahl 1989, Weale 2007), while overlooking why we 
might value ‘input’ in itself. Liberal societies regard people as entitled to go their own 
way, even at the expense of making mistakes. True, part of the reason is so they may 
learn from their errors. But more significant is the importance of treating individuals 
as responsible agents, the empirical difficulties as well as the problematic moral 
justifiability of others defining what is right for someone else, the dangers posed by 
even an enlightened despotism given human fallibility and so on. None of these issues 
imply individuals can do no wrong, merely that it is more legitimate for them to take 
decisions – even wrong ones – than for others to take them on their behalf, especially 
given these others may err about what is good for them too. Such factors motivate the 
‘input’ account of democracy as much as considerations about good ‘outcomes’. 
Three related arguments play a key role in justifying democracy: considerations of 
political equality; the reasonableness of political disagreement and the proneness to 
fallibility of most human decision-making; and the need to ensure politicians are 
accountable and responsive to the public interest (Weale 2007, ch. 3). All three 
reinforce the importance of ‘input’ considerations as vital to, and to some degree 
having a quite independent force from, ‘output’ considerations.  
Many accounts prioritise autonomy rather than equality (e.g. Lakoff 1996, p. 163; 
Held 2006, ch. 10). However, viewing democracy as a system of self-government 
proves hard to sustain (Christiano 1996, ch.1; Weale 2007, pp. 106-115). All but the 
most civic minded will experience some tension between their pursuit of personal 
autonomy in the private sphere and participation in public decision-making.. Private 
autonomy may depend on a public system of rules, giving us an instrumental 
incentive to play a part in shaping them – a point central to the third argument for 
democracy. Yet, seeing these collective arrangements as expressions of individual 
autonomy requires fairly stringent demands be met that amount to a form of 
anarchism unlikely to be realisable (Wolff 1970).  Not only is it improbable that all 
public decisions could reflect a consensus on what each citizen regards as necessary 
for their private autonomy, but also designing a decision making procedure in which 
such a result could theoretically be achieved is practically impossible, given that it 
would have to include the opportunity to vote on all conceivable options for any 
potential collective decision. Some accounts that adopt this model seek to overcome 
these difficulties by employing perfectionist reasoning about the goods and rights 
 4 
needed for individuals to be ‘truly’ autonomous. These theories tend to shade into 
`outcome’ versions of democracy – stipulating so many preconditions for citizens to 
exercise their private and public autonomy that little remains to be decided by the 
democratic process (e.g. Held 2006, p. 282). Indeed, their democratic credentials 
seem circular, stipulating what kinds of ‘output’ would be democratic and making 
these pre-conditions of the democratic process. By contrast, an ‘input’ perspective 
distinguishes a process that accords each person equal standing as an autonomous 
reasoner about our collective life from one that produces decisions that might 
correspond to and not inhibit the autonomous decisions of each and every citizen. 
Whereas the latter may be impossible to achieve, the former follows from any process 
that accords us an equal weight in making and contesting decisions. 
The second argument enters here, noting how democratic procedures reflect the 
need to make collective decisions in the ‘circumstances of politics’, where those 
concerned have valid differences about the justification or advisability of different 
policies based on potentially incommensurable and incompatible normative and 
empirical judgements (Weale 2007, pp. 12-18; Waldron 1999, pp. 107-13). As Rawls 
noted, not all political disagreements arise out of, malign, selfish, or myopic thinking. 
Most result from ideological divisions that reflect reasonable disagreements stemming 
from the ‘the burdens of judgement’: namely,  ‘the many hazards involved in the 
correct (and conscientious) exercise of our powers of reason and judgement in the 
ordinary course of political life’. (Rawls 1993, pp. 55-6) They involve both the 
empirical difficulties within complex and open societies of weighing up evidence, 
identifying causal processes, and estimating the consequences of different decisions 
and policies, and the normative difficulties of assessing which factors are morally 
relevant or how moral factors of different kinds might be combined or prioritised, 
overcoming the vagueness of our concepts, especially when it comes to hard cases, 
and reconciling the divergent moral and political views that people’s different life 
experiences may lead them to adopt (Rawls 1993, pp. 56-7). Accordingly, a consensus 
is unlikely on what course of action best promotes the public interest on any given 
issue.  Rather, people will hold numerous alternative and potentially equally valid 
points of view. Consequently, democracy cannot be defined by ‘outputs’ that 
supposedly enshrine the democratic values of equal concern and respect. Instead, we 
need equitable ‘input’ processes for reaching and contesting decisions – including 
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decisions about these very processes – that ensure all views obtain an equal hearing 
and policies can be reviewed in the light of evolving views and experience. 
Finally, political equality and the ‘circumstances of politics’ require rulers to be 
accountable and responsive to the ruled. If political equality demands all citizens be 
treated equally in their capacity as autonomous reasoners and sources of information 
about their collective life, while the circumstances of politics suggest they will often 
disagree, make mistakes and change their minds, then we need mechanisms to 
encourage rulers regularly to consult  the ruled and accord them equal concern and 
respect. These incentives come from institutionalising ways of screening politicians to 
select those inclined to respond to public views in an even handed and effective way, 
and sanctioning them when they do not , are incompetent or their policies prove 
flawed. 
Taken together, these three arguments give citizens an interest in processes that 
respond to their concerns in ways that are fair and impartial. Meanwhile, they need 
not regard the results as ‘right’, merely as legitimate. What is counts is being included 
in the process, having their views treated on a par with everyone else, and not feeling 
permanently excluded from consideration. If a core function of democracy is to allow 
necessary binding collective decisions to be made despite valid disagreements and 
uncertainty about their potential effects, tthese qualities seem vital. In addition, they 
promote mutual respect and reciprocity among citizens. For the losers in any vote are 
not being told they are mad or bad, merely that they have been outvoted. Moreover, 
they can hope to win in future – a possibility that invariably gives them some 
influence even when they lose. 
The case for the Schumpeterian model of democracy that characterises the 20 
or so ‘working democracies’ worldwide  lies in its capacity to meet these three ‘input’ 
criteria to an adequate degree (Bellamy 2007, ch. 6). Indeed, those that perform best 
on Freedom House measures tend to be the democracies with the least deviations 
from this model towards ‘output’ democracy of the sorts examined below (Dahl 2002, 
pp. 164-5). The Schumpeter model has two basic elements: majority rule and party 
competition.  Together they promote political equality, respect the circumstances of 
politics, and ensure decisions are both responsive and accountable. 
Majority rule offers a fair and impartial equal weighing of votes that is 
anonymous, neutral and positively responsive as well as decisive (May 1952). 
Moreover, the Condorcet jury theory suggests that if there is a better than even chance 
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people are more right than wrong, then the probability is that the majority view will 
indeed be right too – with that probability increasing dramatically the higher the 
majority (Condorcet 1976). What about the problems Condorcet revealed of cyclical 
majorities, and the related Arrovian issues of instability, incoherence or manipulation? 
Mackie (2003) has shown, though logically possible, these phenomena are rare - not 
least because party competition socialises voters so their preferences resemble each 
other sufficiently for cycles to be unusual and eliminable by relatively simple decision 
rules. Competition in a two dimensional space also promotes convergence on the 
median voter, which is generally the Condorcet winner (Ordeshook 1986, pp. 245-
57).  In these respects, elections do work as a process of ‘truth orientated deliberation’ 
that precedes the simple aggregative phase. Moreover, the fact that most majorities 
within pluralist societies are shifting coalitions of minorities, means that the proneness 
of any ruling coalition to cycling gives it an incentive to reach out beyond its 
immediate membership to excluded groups to retain power (McGann 2004, pp. 56, 
71). 
These standard features of a Schumpeterian `actually existing democracy’ 
promote political equality because they instantiate the status of voters as political 
equals – none has a lower status than anyone else and all are potentially involved in 
decisions. It meets the ‘circumstances of politics’ because majority voting on the basis 
of one person, one vote offers an impartial mechanism for resolving disagreements 
that is neither biased towards any view nor assumes the superiority of any one of 
them. However, the dynamics of party competition also encourages equality of 
concern as well as respect through instituting a ‘balance of power’ between both 
different sections of the electorate and rulers and ruled. The need to construct 
majorities from shifting coalitions of minorities while converging on the median voter 
means that voters are effectively forced to compromise with each other. Party 
programmes involve trade-offs between millions of voters that involve either bargains 
that seek to split the difference between different sets of preferences or identifying 
agreed second bests. Because an alternative government always waits in the wings, 
governments must engage in an almost daily referendum, whereby policies are 
updated in anticipation of a future election. As a result, they are responsive to and 
accountable for changing attitudes and conditions and policy failure (Bellamy 2007, 
ch. 6). 
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None of the above means majoritarian, competitive party democracy works 
perfectly or even, given voter decline, is in good health. Merely, that when it 
functions reasonably well - with either a plurality or some proportional electoral 
system - it has the capacity to reflect a coherent set of ‘input’ criteria. Moreover, these 
‘input’ qualities invariably have positive benefits for the quality of ‘outputs’. It is 




Scharpf defines ‘output’ democratic legitimacy as collectively binding decisions that 
‘serve the common interests of the constituency’ (Scharpf 1999b, p. 268; 1999a p. 
11).  Differentiating such decisions from those that result from standard democratic 
‘inputs’ turns on one of two claims (Scharpf 1999a, pp. 12-13,16; Majone 1998, 
2001). On the one hand, ‘non-majoritarian’ arguments suggest an appropriate process 
exists for determining substantive democratic outcomes, at least in certain well 
defined domains. These render ‘input’ arguments unnecessary and possibly even 
subversive of democratic ends. On the other hand, counter-majoritarian arguments 
seek to correct supposed distortions of the ‘input’ process so that these favour more 
equitable outcomes – something especially necessary in culturally diverse societies 
that do not share a national political identity. Both mechanisms are rampant within the 
EU. The ECJ, ECB and a host of standard setting bodies are allegedly ‘non-
majoritarian’. Co-decision procedures and consensual or qualified-majority voting in 
the Council of Ministers are counter-majoritarian in requiring super-majorities on the 
grounds that only in this way will the common interests of all concerned be addressed 
in an equitable manner.  
These two arguments share the view that standard democratic ‘inputs’ distort 
decision making by registering false `positives’ or false `negatives’ (Pettit 2004, p. 
60). Non-majoritarian mechanisms aim at avoiding false ‘positives’. Their proponents 
fear electoral incentives could lead politicians to attend too much to unrepresentative 
groups, such as voters in marginal seats, actual or potential donors to their campaigns, 
or others able to exercise pressure disproportionate to their electoral strength through 
their place within the economy, media or other potential sources of social influence on 
voters’ behaviour. Or they may sacrifice long term goals to short term electoral 
advantages – for example, by promising tax cuts that undermine the capacity of future 
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governments to pay for infrastructural improvements. Politicians may also be in a 
position to skew elections in their own favour, thereby avoiding electoral 
accountability – say, by manipulating constituency boundaries. In such cases, if the 
criteria of a fairer and more efficient ‘output’ are widely agreed, and the means for 
achieving it technical matters where what counts is expertise rather than political 
support, then `depoliticising’ strategies that remove such decisions from the influence 
of democratic ‘in puts’ may be in the public interest. Counter-majoritarian 
mechanisms aim at false ‘negatives’. This danger arises with consistent minorities. 
Even in systems of proportional representation (PR), the logical possibility exists for a 
majority to exclude minority views from the agenda. Counter-majoritarianism seeks 
to give them a hearing.  
Unfortunately, neither of these mechanisms proves better at tackling the 
respective problem each address than standard ‘input’ mechanisms, while risking 
creating the difficulty they neglect – false negatives in the first case, and false 
positives in the second.  Their failings derive from both possessing parallel vices to 
the virtues of ‘in put’ democracy: namely, not respecting political equality, 
overlooking the ‘circumstances of politics’, and being unresponsive and lacking 
accountability (Bellamy, 2009).   
 
Non-Majoritarian 
There are two forms of non-majoritarian, non-party democracy. The first appeals to 
deliberation among experts, the second to direct deliberative democracy among the 
people as a whole or some selected sub-set. Each claims to be more ‘truth-orientated’, 
because better designed to weigh impartially all aspects of a problem, than 
majoritarian democracy. Neither effectively grounds that claim.  
Democratic expertise has supplied the main argument for the non-majoritarian 
account of ‘output’ democracy (Majone 1996,1998, 2001; Scharpf 1999a, pp. 15-16; 
Moravscik 2002). This case turns on a distinction between ‘redistributive’ and 
‘regulatory’ policies and arguing that majoritarian or counter-majoritarian measures 
may be appropriate for the former but are unnecessary or even pernicious for the latter 
(Majone 1996, pp. 294-6). In the regulatory arena, citizens look for Pareto-efficient 
improvements that correct for market failure. Such measures are the bread and butter 
of the EU but, being win-win and highly technical, are uncontentious and 
consequently have low electoral salience. These policies require expertise, equity and 
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efficiency - qualities best provided by experts representing national interests yet 
isolated from short-term electoral considerations or powerful pressure groups, which 
tend to produce suboptimal solutions and raise transaction costs as various influential 
interests get bought off. 
There is a weak and a strong version of this non-majoritarian argument. The 
strong version resembles what Dahl calls guardianship (Dahl 1989, ch. 4). It assumes 
the availability in certain areas of something like a science of the public good , and 
that only specialists will possess such knowledge. The weak argument suggests 
merely that experts are more likely (or, in a even weaker version, are as likely) to 
make conscientious and informed decisions about certain policies because they are 
freer from some of the potentially malign incentives that exist in a system of majority 
rule. 
Given their distinction between redistributive and regulative measures, 
Majone and Schapf apparently grant that we have no epistemological grounding for 
our moral ontological claims to compare with a mathematical proof or the 
experimental method in natural science. The difficulty is that most ‘purely’ technical 
decisions raise normative issues and are often less clear-cut empirically than is 
claimed (Bellamy 2006, pp. 734-42). Even policy decisions that rest on reasonably 
well-attested natural scientific arguments cannot be decided by scientific experts 
alone. Thus, scientific arguments for global warming still leave open a wide range of 
moral and political choices about how it might best be tackled, with experts disputing 
the equity, efficiency or effectiveness of particular measures. Social science 
invariably yields even less clear cut policy advice... Social scientists may be experts 
on particular policy areas, but can never fully account for – and lack expertise in -  
knock on effects in other areas, many of which are unpredictable innovations, 
behavioural changes, acts of God and the like. Expert judgements inevitably rest on 
assumptions about the way of the world, how things work or people behave that are at 
best gross if necessary simplifications, at worst not very rigorous guesses. 
Consequently, it is hard to think of a technical decision without discretionary 
elements. We know, for example, that differing economic theories or divergent best 
guesses about how the world economy is going lead economic advisors to central 
banks often to disagree about interest rate increases or decreases (McNamara 2002).  
It is sometimes claimed that their disagreements can nonetheless be resolved 
more consensually as result of their engaging in a more deliberative and ‘truth 
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orientated’ discursive process than, say, legislatures. Whereas the latter involve self-
interested bargaining and block votes, the former employ a more public model of 
reason giving that reflects clear norms of argumentation deriving from shared criteria 
about a ‘good’ argument (Pettit 2004; Sunstein 1993, pp. 24-5). Jorges and Neyer 
(1997) defend comitology on these grounds as deliberative fora where a problem-
solving approach overcomes national bargaining to produce agreements that favour 
the supranational public interest. However,  not only are  electoral campaigns and 
debates in legislatures and committees not devoid of deliberation, but the argument 
also over estimates the epistemic qualities of deliberation itself and the degree to 
which it takes place (Pollack 2003). Experts can be particularly susceptible to ‘group-
think’, which may be reinforced rather than challenged by such processes. Insider, 
expert norms can be self-serving products of an entrenched paradigm within a given 
professional community that may have become immunised from critical scrutiny 
and/or the legitimate concerns of citizens. Even if deliberation is full, open and 
critical, valid disagreements may remain - as participants in any seminar know. When 
a collective decision is needed, these disputes are generally resolved by the much 
derided majority vote. We have no reason to believe that the votes of expert bodies 
are less prone to cycles. Indeed, given the small numbers involved, so that whoever 
chairs is more likely to know the preference orderings of his or her colleagues, they 
may be much more liable to arbitrary manipulation arising from agenda setting and 
voting schedules (Bellamy, 2009; Janis 1982; Gambetta 1998). 
 The weaker version enters here, claiming these expert bodies are nonetheless 
better informed than the average citizen on such matters. As Moravsick remarks: `We 
do not expect complex, legal or technical decisions to be made by direct popular 
vote.’ (Moravsick 2002, p. 344) True – but  the ‘input’ argument never suggested they 
should be,  merely that voters be able to choose between various packages laid out 
before them in terms they can understand and  hold to account those who fail to 
deliver. For voters can register ‘policy spill-overs’ a given expert body lacks the 
competence or feedback to tackle or appreciate. Politicians regularly seek expert 
advice and have proven able to formulate sophisticated policies in such areas as 
taxation. Yet they must also respond to citizens who, though not economic experts or 
criminologists, feel the broad effects of a poorly performing economy or rising levels 
of crime. Most domestic non-majoritarian regulators are embedded within 
majoritarian systems. It is not just that elected politicians can influence domestic 
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regulatory bodies through various formal or informal screening and sanctioning 
mechanisms, such bodies are also subject to public opinion through the media. Courts, 
Banks, medical bodies all find it hard to buck sustained national majorities. Such 
pressures are much less evident in the EU because its public sphere is vestigial and 
political control and responsiveness more muted.1 Worse, the possibilities of 
regulatory capture may be increased by the closeness of EU regulation to various 
‘stakeholders’, notably business and unions (Cohen and Thatcher 2005, pp. 341-42.), 
while the relative obscurity of their decision-making processes allows national 
politicians to engage in blame shifting to an anonymous ‘Brussels’. 
Direct-deliberative democracy through referenda or special consultative 
forums with civil society groups has been offered as a corrective both to the presumed 
self-interested bargaining of party democracy and self-serving or selective technical 
expertise. Many advocated them as mechanisms for legitimising the failed 
Constitutional Treaty – the convention was a small deliberative forum, the ratification 
process – usually advocated as a pan-European affair - was to have been an act of 
popular deliberation. Yet, as has been noted with lobbying by civil society groups 
more generally (Warleigh 2001; Kroger 2008), the Convention involved considerable 
political bargaining and lobbying by unaccountable and unrepresentative groups. No 
incentive structure existed to consider the public interest as articulated by the public 
themselves, merely the interests of those with access. Civil society groups could focus 
on a single issue without having to balance their concerns against those of others as 
part of a public programme. Instead, they could simply push an arbitrary agenda. 
Meanwhile, that agenda set the terms of the referenda. The broader electorate had no 
mechanism for ensuring the Treaty responded to the broad range and balance of 
public concerns except by rejecting it altogether (Castiglione et. al. 2007). 
Thus, non-majoritarian devices cannot really substitute for an ‘input’ 
majoritarian process. They fail to overcome the basic case for such mechanisms given 
by the three arguments explored above. Mechanisms relying on expertise regard 
‘political equality’, accountability and responsiveness as inappropriate because they 
contend the ‘circumstances of politics’ do not apply to certain types of technical 
decision, thereby ignoring the obstacles posed by reasonable normative and empirical 
disagreements and fallibility to attempts to objectively define the common good even 
in these areas. In the process, they create false negatives that a democratic ‘input’ 
process would be more apt to correct for and register as many – if not more - false 
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positives. By restricting access, they increase the likelihood of decision-makers 
serving partial concerns. They may be denied vital information by foreclosing 
feedback from public opinion regarding the impact of their decisions, exhibit 
professional bias, be unduly subservient to the politicians or others that select them, 
and be more open to regulatory capture. For example, devolving the setting of interest 
rates to central banks can insulate from public scrutiny the neo-monetarist content of 
orthodox monetary policy choices by presenting them as the product of ‘sound’ 
economic management. Yet, such choices may serve financial institutions better than 
the economy at large and be overly skewed to serve their interests – a prime instance 
of the sort of ‘false positive’ problem this mechanism was supposed to guard against 
(Hay 2007, pp. 113-18). Selective consultation with ‘stakeholders’ creates a parallel 
dilemma, with the agenda potentially getting set by the very groups whose interests 
regulation should be seeking to harmonise with the public interest. Finally, there is 
nothing particularly deliberative about referenda –its simplistic alternatives between 
‘yes’ and ‘no’ on a question set by elites on the basis at best of partial consultation 
lies in stark contrast with the deliberative process of electoral politics, where a 
constant dialogue gets institutionalised between the multifarious views of different 
sections of the electorate in the effort of rival parties to build a winning coalition of 
support. None of the above denies that such mechanisms might occasionally 
supplement standard forms of ‘input democracy’, as is the case in many member 
states. However, they are directly or indirectly controllable by formal or informal 
political channels that respond to majoritarian politics and public opinion. Thus, 
central banks have to deal with widespread discussion of their decisions in the media 
and the governors are often accountable to and removable by politicians. By contrast, 
no pan-European public sphere exists capable of generating an equivalent pressure in 
the EU, while political control of the ECB is substantially weaker. 
 
Counter-majoritarian 
 ‘Counter-majoritarian’ mechanisms tackle the basic` input’ case more directly by 
seeking to highlight voices liable to go unheard within a majoritarian democracy 
(Majone 1996, pp. 285-7; Sunstein 1993, ch. 1). These too come in strong and weak 
forms. Strong forms offer democratic mechanisms for defining the common interest 
by forcing consensual decision making. Weak forms merely constrain majoritarianism 
to correct ‘input’ bias or protect particular ‘outputs’. However, giving extra weighting 
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to potentially excluded voices or ‘false negatives’, risks their becoming over 
represented ‘false positives’ that exclude equally important voices in their turn. 
Some common political devices are sometimes mischaracterised as counter-
majoritarian. So PR has been contrasted to majoritarian electoral systems. But the 
contrast is with plurality systems, PR being merely a more accurate way of calculating 
the majority. Likewise, federalism and other mechanisms for devolving power simply 
designate the appropriate community for majority decision-making. They only 
become counter-majoritarian when particular groups or different federal units are 
given special weighting, so that collective decisions between different communities 
have to be made consensually or by supermajorities. Most EU decision-making – both 
in the Council and the Parliament - requires consensus or supermajorities, with co-
decision procedures exacerbating these effects to make it among the most 
systematically counter-majoritarian political systems in the world, second only to the 
United States (Fabbrini 2004). 
Strong versions of counter-majoritarianism claim a unanimity condition offers 
a perfect democratic procedure for defining the common interest, ensuring no 
collective measure gets adopted that does not outweigh the costs, however they are 
distributed (Buchanan and Tullock 1965, 12, 14). However, this multiplying of veto 
points is biased towards the status quo, and unless the base line conditions are entirely 
equitable, may entrench great injustices (Rae 1969, 1975). Indeed, it is largely 
advocated by libertarians keen to protect property rights. Within the EU, unanimity 
voting within the Council offers the prime instance of strong counter-majoritarianism. 
At one level, it can be justified as ensuring the EU only operates in spheres genuinely 
mutually advantageous for all member states. Of course, that could mean policies that 
would benefit the majority of European citizens fail to get adopted. It depends on 
whether it is more legitimate to view citizens primarily as members of states or 
members of the EU. Even in the former case, a state might manage to block a reform 
beneficial to the other states. Moreover, if decisions by state representatives are 
insulated from domestic majoritarian pressures, they may only respond to sectional 
interests lobbying on a given issue. CAP offers the prime example, remaining the 
largest area of EU expenditure despite a decline in the importance of the agricultural 
sector and external pressures for reform. Each of those with a primary say in the 
decision – the ‘iron triangle’ of agricultural ministers, agriculture officials in the 
commission, and European farming interests – has a vested interest in supporting the 
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other, while the costs of mobilising consumers against CAP is greater than the 
average cost to each taxpayer (Keeler 1996; Nedergaard 1995). 
Weaker versions are designed to protect what US constitutional discourse 
terms ‘discrete, insular minorities’, with little or no chance of allying with others to 
secure political influence. How far this is likely within the EU is debateable, and the 
degree to which the appropriate minorities are sets of member states rather than 
dispersed sub-national minorities within them even more so. Again, such 
arrangements risk making it harder for unprivileged minorities to overcome the 
entrenched position of privileged minorities, as the regressive effects of the USA’s 
system of multiple veto points starkly demonstrates (McGann 2004). Moreover, they 
favour concentrated over dispersed minorities. If minorities are not discrete and 
isolated, they have more to gain from being pivotal actors in alliance building than in 
seeking special protections that may work against them. Consociational arrangements 
can also give elites incentives to maximise rather than reduce their differences and to 
solidify group differences rather than allowing them to evolve or reduce (Barry 1975). 
Indeed, where the legitimacy of the state and the role of given groups within it takes 
precedence over all other issues, responsiveness and accountability on the quality of 
government gets severely reduced.  
A number of weak counter-majoritarian arrangements exist within the EU, 
including Qualified Majority Voting in the Council, the need for final resolutions of 
EU legislation in the European Parliament to obtain a majority of all MEPs, and co-
decision . These mechanisms favour a dominant coalition that is ideologically centrist 
and mildly pro-integration, though the dynamics differ depending on whether the 
issue has Left-Right or pro-anti integration as the main cleavage. Either way, super- 
majoritarianism gives power to the dominant partners – the EPP-PS grand coalition in 
the Parliament and the Franco-German alliance in the Council – and a small number 
of potential voting partners, depending on the issue, with certain groups permanently 
excluded (Hosli 1995, 1996, 1997). Once again, the logic of ‘input’ majoritarianism 
within the EU systems seems more justified than attempts to structure the system in 
ways that might produce more favourable outputs or that seek to privilege certain 
minority positions.  
I have left to one side the role of the ECJ. Courts can be characterised as both 
non-majoritarian and counter-majoritarian. Their operation has been viewed as non-
majoritarian, with multi-member courts like the ECJ, seen as models of deliberation, 
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while their effect has been deemed counter-majoritarian. These have been seen as 
desirable qualities for constitutional courts in particular (e.g. Dworkin 1996, 
‘Introduction’). However, their effects are often perverse (Bellamy 2007, Waldron 
2006). Once again, the non-majoritarian aspect may register false negatives, and the 
counter-majoritarian aspect produce false positives. The only issues that can be 
legitimately discussed within a court are those affecting parties with legal standing 
who have a case as defined by law. These restrictions uphold the ‘rule of law’ by 
ensuring the equitable application of settled law to all, but become disadvantages in 
situations  - common to constitutional courts – where court decisions effectively make 
public policy. For, the case under consideration may be untypical and decisions have 
knock on effects for important interests and persons whose concerns the court cannot 
consider. Moreover, those with access to the court and possessing the resources to 
raise the case may be highly unrepresentative groups.  
The ECJ often operates as a de facto constitutional court, and suffers from 
these drawbacks. Partly because the EU’s governance structures are so fragmented 
and its administrative capacity weak, while the move from national to pan-European 
networks means the parties involved are often unknown to each other, there have been 
incentives for actors to seek rule governed, legalistic approaches to regulation at the 
EU level (Kelemen and Sibbitt 2002),. However, the strong judicial enforcement of 
formal public rules increases judicial discretion and many of the disadvantages of 
non-majoritarian decision-making. The court has a natural predisposition to reinforce 
the ‘negative’ integrationist, market-building agenda enshrined in the four freedoms 
of capital, labour, services and goods that lie at the heart of the European project. This 
tendency has produced the effective constitutionalisation of competition law, with the 
ECJ monopolising judgements on when ‘public interest’ restrictions apply and 
challenging the majoritarian decisions of national legislatures and governments – 
including the exemption of public sector jobs and services (Scharpf 1999a 54-8). Such 
changes can be in the interests of consumers and workers alike. But they respond less 
to such public ‘interests’ as the ‘private’ interests of those individuals and bodies 
possessing access to press for a ruling. Consequently, they risk registering false 
positives in the manner typical of counter-majoritarian arrangements. That need not 
always be the case, as in some kinds of public interest litigation (Harlow 1999: 49-
52). However, legal avenues tend to be exploited disproportionately by corporate 
bodies (Harding 1992). Used excessively, litigation can also stunt the evolution of 
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democratic, collective problem solving, and divert attention to ultimately self-
defeating forms of individual redress, particularly in the area of compensation and 
liability (Harlow 1996). Unfortunately, the EU has actively encouraged such moves to 
make up for the democratic deficit, often under the banner of citizenship rights. In so 
doing, the EU is fuelling a more Americanised and adversarial legal culture, which 
favours those with deep pockets over the resource poor, compensatory over 
redistributive justice, and individual over collective benefits. In the process, ECJ 
decisions can undermine the interpretation of rights that people have made as 
democratic citizens of the member states. For example, a decision like Watts, making 
health services subject to ‘free movement’ and allowing individuals to escape waiting 
lists and other domestic forms of rationing by shopping for treatments elsewhere, 
undercuts the capacity of states to plan and favours mobile and articulate individuals 
at the expense of the poor. It also places courts in the quandary of making substantive 
decisions about an individual’s health needs without any obligation to consider their 
knock-on effects for health and other policies (Newdick 2006). 
 
Conclusion 
This paper has defended the virtues of ‘input’ majoritarian democracy and pointed to 
various vices of ‘output’ orientated non-majoritarian and counter-majoritarian 
democracy. I have not looked at whether majoritarian democracy is plausible for the 
EU. Many commentators doubt that it is, at least for the foreseeable future. Size, lack 
of a common language and media, the absence of shared identities and affective 
bonds, and the presence of very diverse and well institutionalised national political 
cultures within the member states, all present powerful obstacles, though over the 
very long term not necessarily insuperable ones (Scharpf 1999a, 9-10;  Bellamy, 
Castiglione and Shaw 2006; Weale 2005) . However, the current trend, found in all 
the member states, is for democracy to be devolved downwards, towards smaller and 
more culturally homogenous units, rather than upwards, to larger and more diverse 
political entities (Kymlicka 1999). 
Therefore, let us assume that satisfactory majoritarian mechanisms are not 
available to the EU and unlikely to be so.2 In these circumstances, are imperfect non-
majoritarian and counter-majoritarian mechanisms the best we can get? I noted how 
some commentators contend that the EU mainly deals with issues that are neither best 
handled by democratic politics nor electorally salient (Scharpf 1999a, 11-13; Majone 
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1996; Moravscik 2002). Though I demurred from this analysis, it contains a kernel of 
truth. If we conceive of the EU as primarily an organisation for cooperation between 
democratic states rather than as a mechanism for transcending them, then different 
standards may legitimately apply. One could argue that such situations require 
arrangements to be mutually advantageous but not that they reflect more stringent 
criteria of justice that might call for redistribution (Miller 2008, 394-6). The reasoning 
here is that each of these states has its own internal systems of social justice for which 
its citizens are co-responsible thorough their equal participation within majoritarian 
systems of democracy. To the extent the wealth and survival of these states depends 
on cooperation with other states, it seems appropriate to share the costs and benefits 
of these arrangements equitably. To provide such agreements with democratic 
legitimacy it will be sufficient that the citizens of each member state are satisfied that 
this is an area where interaction and cooperation is desirable or necessary – for 
example in order to set fish quotas so fishing will be sustainable or to promote trade. 
Moreover, the surpluses generated by such accords need only be Pareto-
improvements, with each party gaining to an equal degree from the resulting benefits 
subject to compensatory measures for temporary losers so that a ‘no wealth effects’ 
condition holds. For this latter purpose, a mix of non-majoritarian and counter-
majoritarian mechanisms between state representatives will be justified since nothing 
in such a system suggests any change is required with the status quo so far as the 
relative standing of the parties involved is concerned – quite the reverse. From this 
perspective, the democratic deficit within the EU brought about by the absence of 
effective majoritarian democratic mechanisms is twofold. On the one hand, national 
electorates and parliaments, where these systems function well, ought to have a more 
decisive voice in deciding the scope and extent of the EU and the spheres it enters 
(Mair 2007). On the other hand, attempts to move towards majoritarian democracy 
within the EU become illegitimate, because they suggest an inappropriate role for an 
EU ‘people’ in judging its own competences and seeking a more egalitarian 
distribution among them that transcends national borders (Bellamy 2008, Weale 
2005). In sum, the non-majoritarian and counter-majoritarian mechanisms of the EU 
can be legitimised so long as their scope and operation is controlled by the 
majoritarian systems of the member states – with them taking over this role from the 
ECJ. However, when removed from such control, they cannot offer pan-European 
decision-making with anything but spurious and ineffective democratic credentials.  
 18 
 
Biographical Note Richard Bellamy is Professor of Political Science, UCL, 
University of London. 
 
Address for correspondence Department of Political Science, University College 
London, 29/30 Tavistock Square, London WC1H 9QU 
 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
Versions of this paper were presented at the Connex Workshops and conferences at 
Reading and Manchester. I am grateful to participants for helpful observations, and to 
David Coen, Christine Reh, Fritz Scharpf and the journal’s editors and referees for 
written comments. 
 
                                                 
NOTES 
 
1 Hix 2000 suggests the EP might act as a ‘fire alarm’, but its ‘in put’ credentials are 
weak. 
 
2  For the alternative scenario of establishing majoritarian democracy in the EU, see 
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